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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

On September 23, 2016, Decedent Robert Alan Wall, Sr. (hereinafter referred to as the
"Decedent" or "Bob") executed a Last Will and Testament (hereinafter referred to as the "Will").
The Will was a generic form will, purchased by the Decedent online and executed without the
assistance of an attorney. While the Will was validly executed by the Decedent, the Will's
residuary distribution clause does not identify a beneficiary of the residuary estate.
Petitioner/Appellant David Arredondo (hereinafter referred to as "Arredondo") contends the
instructions in the form Will do not expressly direct responding testators to name a beneficiary,
which resulted in the Decedent's failure to name such beneficiary; thus, the instructions in the Will
are ambiguous. One of the results which can occur with such inherent ambiguity is demonstrated
here, where the Decedent inadvertently failed to name a beneficiary of his Estate despite executing
an otherwise valid Will. Thus, the central question before this Court is whether the Will is
ambiguous, and whether extrinsic evidence on the Decedent's intent for the disposition of his
Estate should be allowed to resolve the ambiguity. The lower courts either failed to address or
ignored this argument. The lower courts agreed that instructions in form wills can be unclear and
confusing, but refused to explain their conclusion that this Will's instructions are not ambiguous,
even though the results of their decisions were expressly contrary to the Decedent's wishes.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

i.

Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal

Representative: On April 30, 2018, Arredondo filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and
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Appointment of Personal Representative (hereinafter referred to as the "Petition") following the
Decedent's death. R., pp. 7-15. As explained in the Petition, a copy of the Will was provided to
the Court because the original will could not be located. Id. at p. 8. Paragraph 1 of the Petition
states that Arredondo believes he and his wife, Gloria Arredondo, are the intended beneficiaries
and that the Will contains ambiguities. Id. at p. 7.
ii.

Robert Alan Wall. Jr.'s Obiection:

On June 1, 2018, the Decedent's son,

Respondent Robert Alan Wall, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as "Robert"), filed an Objection to
Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative
(hereinafter referred to as "Robert's Objection"). Id. at pp. 16-19. The primary basis of Robert's
Objection was the absence of a named beneficiary to tlie Decedent's estate. Id. at p. 17.
Additionally, Robert's Objection states that, despite attempts to locate her, the whereabouts of his
sister, Robin, remained unknown at that time. 1 Id.
iii.

Order of Formal Appointment of Personal Representative:

Pursuant to

Robert's Objection, the matter came before the Court for a hearing on September 19, 2018. The
parties present at the hearing (Arredondo and Robert) entered a stipulation on the record. Upon the
parties' stipulation, the Court entered the Order of Formal Appointment of Personal
Representative on October 5, 2018 appointing Arredondo as the Personal Representative of the
Decedent's estate. Id. at pp. 37-39.

1

Robert's Objection refers to Robin Wall as Robin Ormandy. Id.
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iv.

Robin Wall's Obiection: Nearly two months after Arredondo's appointment as

Personal Representative, Robin appeared in this matter on November 27, 2018 through her
attorney, Jesse Thomas. Id. at pp. 40-41. Shortly after her appearance, Robin filed her Objection

to Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Counterpetition for Formal Probate in Intestacy
(hereinafter referred to as "Robin's Counterpetition"), claiming an interest in the Estate as an heir
of the Decedent and seeking appointment as Personal Representative of the Estate. Id. at 42-44.

v.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(a) Robin's Motion for Partial Summarv Judgment: Robin submitted a Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter referred to as "Robin's Motion") on February 14,
2019, alleging that no genuine issues of material fact existed concerning distribution of the
Estate. Id. at 45-51. Specifically, Robin argued that the Estate assets should be distributed
according to the laws of intestacy because the Will (allegedly) does not contain a
distribution clause nor does it name an intended beneficiary of the Estate. Id. at pp. 49-50.
(b)

Arredondo's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:

On

February 28, 2019, Arredondo submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter referred to as "Arredondo's Opposition") which
argued the following:
•

Contrary to Robin's assertion, the Will contains a residuary distribution clause in
Paragraph Sixth of the Will;

•

Paragraph Sixth of the Will contains an inherent ambiguity where the instructions
fail to direct the testator to name a beneficiary of the residuary estate;
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•

The Decedent undertook efforts to execute a Will which demonstrates intent for
distribution of the Estate;

•

The Decedent's efforts to exclude his children (Robert and Robin) from inheriting
any portion of the Estate evinced an intention for the overall distribution of the
Estate; and

•

The Court should recognize the inherent ambiguity contained in the directions in
Paragraph Sixth of the Will, together with the clear intent expressed throughout the
uncontested portions of the Will, and allow extrinsic evidence on the Decedent's
intent for distribution of the Estate to be admitted for further consideration before
applying the laws of intestacy, which is a last resort and, in this case, is contrary to
the Decedent's intent. Id. at 52-60.

vi.

Hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: A hearing in this matter

was held before the Honorable Judge Sullivan (Magistrate Judge) on March 14, 2019 during which
the Court heard oral arguments on Robin's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court did
not render a decision at that time but chose instead to take the matter under advisement.
vii.

Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: On April 10, 2019, the

Magistrate Court entered the Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter referred
to as the "Order") granting Robin's Motion. Id. at pp. 71-77. The Magistrate Court determined that
the Will failed to state a beneficiary and, therefore, the laws of intestacy should apply; notably, the
Magistrate Court did not address Arredondo's argument that the Will contains an ambiguity. Id.
viii.

Appeal to District Court
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(a)

Arredondo's Appellant's Brief: On July 3, 2019, Arredondo filed

Appellant's Briefwhich sought a reversal of the Magistrate Court's decision to permit the
Decedent's estate to pass intestate. Id. at 103-128. Arredondo re-asserted the arguments
put before Judge Sullivan and argued that the Magistrate Court's Order failed to address
Arredondo's primary argument regarding the Will's ambiguity. Id.
(b)

Robin's Respondent's Brief: On July 31, 2019, Robin filed Respondent's

Brief which argued that the Magistrate's decision was correct and the Estate should pass
by intestate succession. Id. at 129-144.
(c)

Arredondo's Appellant's Reply Brief: On August 21, 2019 Arredondo filed

Appellant's Reply Brief in further support of Appellant's Brief and contesting various
peripheral arguments made in Robin's Respondent's Brief. Id. at 145-156.
ix.

Hearing on Arredondo's Appeal to District Court: The parties presented oral

argument in Arredondo' s Appeal to District Court on October 10, 2019 before the Honorable Judge
George Southworth. The Court did not render a decision at that time but chose instead to take the
matter under advisement.
x.

Memorandum Decision on Arredondo's Appeal to District Court: On October

18, 2019, Judge Southworth issued the Memorandum Decision affirming the Magistrate Court's
decision to allow the Estate to pass by intestate succession due to the Will's failure to name a
beneficiary. Id. at 160-167. Although the District Court agreed that instructions in form wills can
be unclear and confusing, the Court determined, without explanation, that the instructions in the
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Decedent's Will are not unclear or confusing. Despite the Decedent's corresponding failure to
name a beneficiary, the Court detennined that the Will was not ambiguous. Id. at 163.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Arredondo submits the following set of facts are relevant for this Court's consideration:
i.

The Will is a Fill-in-the-Blank Form Will Purchased Online by the Decedent
and Executed by the Decedent without the Assistance of an Attorney.

As stated above, the Decedent's Will is a generic fill-in-the-blank form will purchased from
an online legal forms shop. Id. at pp. 71, 160. The Decedent, Bob, was a man who worked in the
auto detailing business most of his life. Importantly, and although it is not mentioned in the lower
courts' decisions, Bob executed the Will without the assistance of an attorney. While some
paragraphs in the Will contain clear instructions to the testator on how to provide the required
responses, other paragraphs fail to provide similar necessary directions. Id. at 11-15. This is most
apparent in Paragraph Sixth of the Will, the residuary disposition clause, discussed in further detail
below. Id. at 13.
The paragraphs of the Will described below are relevant for the purposes of this appeal.
ii.

Paragraphs Two and Three of the Will Contain Clear Instructions for the
Testator.

In Paragraph Second, the Will instructs the testator to indicate whether he/she is married,
divorced, widowed or never married by checking the appropriate box. 2 Id. at p. 12. Bob indicated
he was widowed; thus, he knew there was no surviving spouse to inherit his Estate. Id. Bob took

2

Paragraph Second also instructs the testator to name his/her spouse if he/she is married. Id.
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care to execute the Will after the death of his wife, presumably to address issues concerning the
disposition of his Estate.
Next, in Paragraph Third, the Will contains explicit instructions to name the testator's
children, whether living or deceased. Id. This is evident by the plain language used in the
instructions which direct the testator to "declare that I have _ _ _ _(__~) children whose
names are:" Id. (emphasis added). The Will then provides six spaces for the testator to name

his/her children and indicate whether such children are living or deceased. Id.
Despite having two (living) children, Bob left Paragraph Third completely blank. Id. Bob
therefore either failed to name his children, as the instructions clearly directed, or he purposefully
excluded both Robert and Robin from his Will. Considering the specific instructions for the testator
to name his/her children, coupled with Bob's subsequent response to Paragraph Seventh, it is only
logical to conclude that Bob purposefully withheld his children's names. See id. at p. 13.
iii.

The Residuary Disposition Clause (Paragraph Sixth) of the Will Does Not
_Direct the Testator to Name a Beneficiary.

Paragraph Sixth of the Will is the disposition paragraph wherein the testator is expected to
name the intended devisees of the estate. Id. at 13. The directions under Paragraph Sixth simply
provide: "I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my estate, real, personal, and mixed, of
whatsoever kind, nature or description as follows:" Id. Under these directions, the form provides
three fill-in-the-blank lines wherein Bob listed certain real and personal property. Id.
What is critically absent from Paragraph Sixth's instructions is the clear direction to name
the person or persons intended as the beneficiaries of the testator's estate. Id. Compared, for
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example, to Paragraph Third which explicitly directs the testator to name his/her children, the
instructions under Paragraph Sixth are much less specific. See id. at pp. 12-13. Considering Bob's
response to Paragraph Sixth where he listed his real and personal property (instead of naming a
beneficiary), it is apparent that the instructions in Paragraph Sixth misled Bob into believing that
he needed to list property in the Estate rather than name the intended beneficiaries of those items.
While the ambiguity in the instructions may not seem immediately apparent, such ambiguity
becomes apparent upon reading Bob's response to Paragraph Sixth; hence, the paragraph is
ambiguous.
iv.

The Decedent Disinherited Robin, Robert, and His Potential Grandchildren
from the Will (Paragraph Seventh).

In contrast to the Paragraphs Second, Third and Sixth described above, Paragraph Seventh
does not require the testator to provide a response. Id. at p. 13. Instead, Paragraph Seventh
contemplates a distribution of the estate to the testator's grandchildren in the event any of the
testator's children have predeceased him/her. Id. Likewise, Paragraph Seventh provides that, in
the event he/she is predeceased by a child who left no children, the predeceased child's share of
the estate shall go to his/her sibling. Id. No fill-in-the-blank spaces are provided under Paragraph
Seventh, thus indicating that no response was required. Id.
Here, Bob took it upon himself to address the possibility that his Estate might pass to either
of his children or their children. Id. In large printed letters with underlining for emphasis, Bob
wrote in "NO-NO-NO!" and signed with his initials, "RAW." Id. When considered together with
his decision not to identify his children in Paragraph Third, Bob's resolve to prevent his children
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from inheriting any portion of the Estate is clear and leads to the inescapable conclusion that Bob
intended someone other than his children to inherit the Estate.
At the very least, these provisions contradict Robin's argument that the Will fails to reflect
any intent whatsoever on behalf of the Decedent as to how the Estate would be distributed.
Furthermore, these provisions underscore the lower courts' disregard of Bob's intentions when the
courts decided not to fully investigate the motivation behind Bob's expressed wishes in the Will.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Whether the lower courts erred in granting partial summarv judgment against Arredondo
without fullv addressing whether the Will's distribution clause is ambiguous as a matter of
law.

B.

Whether the lower courts erred by assuming the Decedent understood the legal effect of
the language used in his Will when the Will was drafted and executed without the
assistance of an attorney and when the legal effect of the executed Will is contrary to wishes
expressed by the Decedent in his Will.

C.

Whether the lower courts disregarded the clear intent of the Testator/Decedent by ordering
an intestate disposition to Decedent's children in a case where the Decedent executed a
valid Will.

D.

Whether the concern over allowing extrinsic evidence is unfounded.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The above-entitled matter is before the Court on appeal from the District Court's decision
which affirmed the Magistrate Court's decision granting partial summary judgment to Respondent
Robin Wall. As a general standard, the Court tasked with addressing an appeal from a lower court's
granting of a summary judgment motion is expected to apply the same standard applied by the
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lower court when originally ruling on the motion. Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128
Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996).
Pursuant to Rule 56( c) · of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Idaho Building

Contractors Ass 'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v.
Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 890 P.2d 331 (1995). In making this determination, a Court should
liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. See Smith, 128 Idaho at 718, 918 P.2d at 587
(citing Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994)).
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions
or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. See Smith, 128 Idaho at 718, 918 P.2d at 587
(citing Harris v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests, at all times, with
the party moving for summary judgment. Smith, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588. In order to
meet this burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence
the absence of any genuine issues of material fact on an element of the nonmoving party's case.

See id. If the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the
nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence.
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See id. Only if the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists does the burden then shift to the nonmoving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create or demonstrate a genuine issue of fact. See id.
IV.

A.

ARGUMENT

THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST ARREDONDO WITHOUT FULLY ADDRESSING
WHETHER THE WILL'S DISTRIBUTION CLAUSE IS AMBIGUOUS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The central issue before this Court is whether the Will's distribution clause (Paragraph

Sixth) contains an ambiguity; the lower courts were presented with this same question but, as
explained herein, either did not address whether the Will contained an ambiguity or failed to
adequately explain the conclusion that the Will is not ambiguous.
As demonstrated below, Paragraph Sixth of the Will is ambiguous. In this case, it is helpful
to keep in mind the following facts:
1) Bob took the time and care to execute a valid Will: Bob ensured that he was in
compliance with Idaho Code § 15-2-502 for a self-proved will by going to his bank and having
two witnesses sign the Will; even though not required under Idaho law, Bob also had the Will
notarized. R., p. 15. It seems obvious that Bob would only undertake such efforts if he had an
intention for the disposition of his Estate and, accordingly, did not understand that he risked
negating these efforts (and worse, creating a contrary result vis-a-vis intestate succession) by
failing to name a beneficiary in the Will's distribution clause.
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2) Bob undertook significant efforts in the Will to expressly disinherit his children: in
Paragraph Third, Bob did not name either Robin or Robert as his children when the instructions
explicitly called for such and, in Paragraph Seventh, Bob responded to a provision that did not
require a response in the off-chance that either his children (or even his grandchildren) would stand
to inherit any portion of his Estate. 3 Id. at pp. 12-13.
3) Bob did not ignore Paragraph Sixth: rather. he took the time to respond to Paragraph
Sixth by listing real and personal property in his Estate: It is not as if Bob bypassed Paragraph
Sixth- to the contrary, Bob took time and care to execute what he undoubtedly thought was the
appropriate response to the prompt in Paragraph Sixth but, critically, the instructions in
Paragraph Sixth do not direct the testator to identify or name a beneficiary. Id. at p. 13. This

fact might carry less weight if other provisions in the Will were similarly unclear and/or if Bob's
responses elsewhere in the Will were similarly inadequate - but that is not the case. The other
provisions in the Will requiring the testator to identify a person or persons explicitly direct the
testator to name such persons. For example, in Paragraph Fifth, the prompt clearly indicates that
the testator is supposed to identify whom he/she nominates as the representative(s) of his/her
estate. Id. at pp. 12-13. In response to these clear directions, Bob wrote in "David Arredondo" and
"Gloria Arredondo" as the Personal Representative and Alternative Personal Representative,

3

It should be noted that Paragraph Seventh only envisions the scenario where the testator's
children have predeceased him or her. The fact that Bob took it upon himself to address Paragraph
Seventh begs the question of whether Bob was even aware whether Robert and/or Robin were still
living. His efforts were obviously directed towards deleting the reference to his children and/or
their offspring.
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respectively, of his Estate. Id. Considering Bob's handwritten protest next to Paragraph Seventh,
it is obvious that he purposefully bypassed Paragraph Third (which also expressly directs the
testator to name his/her children) to avoid naming his children anywhere in the Will; in fact, the
only names Bob wrote in the Will, aside from his own, are David and Gloria Arrendondo. Id.
Either way, these actions demonstrate that Bob had an intention for the disposition of his Estate.
The lower courts' failure to reconcile its conclusions with these basic facts disregards its primary
responsibility to determine the testator's true intent and to truly and fully effect the testator's
wishes.
i.

Paragraph Sixth of the Will Contains an Inherent Ambiguity.

Ambiguity is defined as "doubtfulness; doubleness of meaning; duplicity, indistinctness,
or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument; want of clearness or
definiteness; difficult to comprehend or distinguish." Black's Law Dictionary 105 (4th ed. 1968)
(emphasis added); see Roe v. Hopper, 90 Idaho 22, 27, 408 P.2d 161, 163-64 (1965). While a
patent ambiguity is "one which is evident from the face of the instrument," a "latent ambiguity is
not evident on the face of the instrument alone, but becomes apparent when applying the
instrument to the facts as they exist." Estate ofKirk v. Seideman, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d
794,801 (1995) (emphasis added); see Black's Law Dictionary 105 (4th ed. 1968) (further defining
an ambiguity as "latent" where "the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but
a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for
interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings .... ").
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The instructions in Paragraph Sixth of the Will do not explicitly direct the testator (Bob) to
name the intended beneficiaries of his/her estate. R. at 13. Whereas other portions of the Will
contain specific directions to name the relevant person or persons, Paragraph Sixth ignores that
vital component. 4 See id. at pp. 12-13. Thus, it is not a coincidence that Bob identified appropriate
persons in the provisions which explicitly directed him to do so, but failed to name an appropriate
person (a beneficiary of his Estate) in the one provision that did not explicitly direct him to do so
(Paragraph Sixth). See id.
Bob's response to Paragraph Sixth sheds even further light on the confusing nature of this
provision's instructions: In response to Paragraph Sixth, Bob listed certain real and personal
property in his Estate but did not name a beneficiary. Id. at 13. Bob may have understandably
interpreted the last two words in the instructions, "as follows:" as a direction to list his "real,
personal, and mixed" property (which he did). Id. Again, the instructions do not direct the testator
to name a beneficiary of his/her estate in response to Paragraph Sixth. Id. At the very least, as
demonstrated by Bob, there is more than one legitimate way to interpret the instructions in
Paragraph Sixth of this Will; thus, the language is ambiguous.
In its decision, the District Court summarily dismissed Arredondo's argwnent that the
absence of explicit instructions in Paragraph Sixth to name the intended beneficiary constituted an
ambiguity. Instead, without any explanation, the District Court determined the instructions in

4

Paragraphs Second, Third, and Fifth are instances in the Will where the instructions clearly direct
the testator to name the relevant person or persons and where Bob either named such persons
(David and Gloria Arredondo) or purposefully omitted the appropriate persons' names (Robert
and Robin). Id. at 12.
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Paragraph Sixth to be unambiguous. Id. As explained in further detail below, this failure to
reconcile the inconsistency between Bob's unequivocal attempt to disinherit his children, Robin
and Robert (as well as their children), and his failure to name a beneficiary in the Will's distribution
clause renders the lower courts' decisions flawed and deficient. The potential result of the courts'
failure to appropriately analyze Arredondo' s argument is intestate succession, which is completely
contrary to Bob's expressed wishes in the Will. Id. at pp. 12-14. This result is reason enough to
consider whether, as Arredondo contends, Paragraph Sixth (and/or the Will in its entirety) contains
an inherit ambiguity and, accordingly, whether further investigation into Bob's intentions for the
disposition of his Estate via an evidentiary hearing is warranted.
Ultimately, the determination of whether the language in a document is ambiguous is a
question oflaw. Tertelingv. Payne, 131 Idaho 389,392,957 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1998). Whether the
language is ambiguous is resolved only by examining the document's relevant provisions to
determine whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." Id.
It is revealing that the only people Bob identified in the Will (aside from himself) are David
and Gloria Arredondo; it bears repeating that Bob identified appropriate persons when expressly
instructed to do so and failed to identify such persons when not expressly instructed to do so. R.,
pp. 12-13. Considering Paragraph Sixth does not ask the testator to name a beneficiary of his/her
estate, and considering Bob identified David and Gloria Arredondo in Paragraph Fifth - which
immediately precedes the distribution clause - it is not unreasonable to assume that Bob believed
he had properly identified David and Gloria Arredondo as the beneficiaries of his Estate. See id.
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"In Estate ofKime, 144 Cal. App. 3d 246, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1983), the California court

expanded its traditional scope of what constitutes an ambiguity. Upon closer examination of the
facts specific to its case, the Kime court determined that the decedent's will, which did not contain
an "explicit dispositive provision," created an ambiguity which could only be resolved through the
admission of extrinsic evidence. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
The facts in Kime are substantially .similar to those present here: In Kime, the form will
used by the decedent "contained no printed language explicitly dispositive; nor did it refer to
beneficiaries or provide clear instruction or indication to a lay person as to where thereon to insert
gifts." Id. at 262, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 728. Similar to the Idaho District Court's acknowledgment in
Bob's case ("it is not surprising that instructions on a fill-in-the-blank legal document obtained
from a legal forms shop ... are unclear and confusing .... "), the Kime court addressed the reality
that "[ sJome resulting confusion and ambiguity might be expected" when a will does not contain
an explicit dispositive provision. Id.; see R., p. 163. Because the Court determined that the form
will did not contain "explicit" dispositive provisions, the Court focused on whether the decedent
intended to name the person she nominated as the "executrix" to also be the beneficiary of the will.

Id. at 262, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
hi its analysis, the court took into consideration that ''the Will form was filled in by

Decedent without the assistance of an attorney, and the circumstances indicate that the Decedent
was unacquainted with the technical meaning of the word 'executrix,"' .... Id. Thus, the Kime
court determined that sufficient evidence existed to suggest that the decedent's misspelling of the
word "executrix" - which she misspelled by substituting an "s" for the "x" - could be susceptible
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to more than one meaning; accordingly, extrinsic evidence was properly introduced to resolve the
ambiguity. 5 Id. In its decision, the Kime court commented on the "stiff formalism of early English
law [which] restricted the admission of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of wills" and
cited to "[r]ecent California decisions [which] have reduced the inflexibility of these strict rules of
interpretation and arbitrary, irrational distinctions resulting in more liberal admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to prove what the testator meant by the words he used." Id. at 261-62, 193 Cal.
Rptr. at 727-28.
Here, Arredondo contends the entirety ofthe instructions in Paragraph Sixth are susceptible
to more than one meaning; specifically, the last two words "as follows:" are misleading. R., p. 13.
Had Paragraph Sixth simply included clear instructions directing testators to name intended
beneficiaries, Bob undoubtedly would have understood to identify such persons - as he did in the
provisions which include explicit directions to name appropriate persons.
Although not directly relevant to Arredondo's argument concerning the ambiguity of
Paragraph Sixth, it is worth noting other considerations of the Kime court. For example, as to
whether oral declarations are admissible as extrinsic evidence to interpret a will, the court
remarked on the decedent's possible state of mind, which, the court reasoned,

may have been such that she reasonably believed the printed
word 'appoint' in the Wolcott form to be an adequate expression
of an intent to designate a beneficiary. Such a common
understanding of the word is apparent from its definition, e.g. in
5

The Kime court cited to another case, Estate of Fries, 221 Cal. App. 2d 725, 34 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1963)
wherein the court allowed extrinsic evidence upon the discovery that the testatrix, using a printed form will,
appointed her husband as the executor of her estate but failed to name a beneficiary. Id. at 263, 193 Cal.
Rptr. at 729.
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Random House College Dictionary (1982 ed.) at page 66: 'appoint .
. . 3. Law. To designate (a person) to take the benefit of an estate
created by a deed or will.' Accordingly, as used here 'appoint' is
not free from ambiguity and may be interpreted as a term of
disposition.

Id. at 264, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30 (emphasis added). Here, Paragraph Fifth of the Will
immediately precedes the distribution provision (Paragraph Sixth). In relevant part, Paragraph
Fifth provides the following: "I hereby nominate and appoint - - - - - - - - - - - as
Personal Representative of this, my last Will and Testament ... In the event of her/his failure,
refusal, or inability to act, then I hereby nominate and appoint as my Alternative Personal
Representative _ _ _ _ _ _~ - - - - · " R., pp. 12-13 (emphasis added). In the first two
spaces, Bob wrote in "David Arredondo" and "Gloria Arredondo" to serve as his Personal
Representative and Alternative Personal Representative, respectively. Id.
Interestingly, the Will also allows for a Second Alternative Personal Representative to be
identified, but Bob declined to do so: As the Second Alternative Personal Representative, Bob
wrote in "State of Idaho" rather than name any other person to serve in that capacity. Id. While
Arredondo contends Paragraph Sixth's instructions are ambiguous in and of themselves, it is worth
considering (as the Kime court did) the proximity of Paragraph Fifth to Paragraph Sixth and
whether Bob believed he had properly identified the beneficiaries to his Estate by naming David
and Gloria Arredondo in the paragraph immediately preceding the distribution provision. See
Kime, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 264, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the one provision in this Will which could either
fulfill or negate the entire purpose of executing a will (Paragraph Sixth) is also the only provision
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that does not clearly and directly instruct the testator to identify his or her intended beneficiaries.

Id. at p. 13. Bob's response to Paragraph Sixth is not unreasonable when considered against the
entirety of the Will document - in every other instance, Bob identified appropriate persons when
explicitly instructed to do so and evidenced his intent throughout the Will for the disposition of
his Estate. At the very least, the instructions in Paragraph Sixth are open to interpretation; thus,
they are ambiguous.
ii.

The Lower Courts Failed to Address Arredondo's Argument that the Will
Contains an Ambiguity.

Although the Magistrate Court acknowledged the inconsistency between Bob's apparent
intentions for the distribution of his Estate and the absence of a named beneficiary in the
distribution, the Magistrate failed to address Arredondo' s argument concerning the alleged
ambiguity of Paragraph Sixth. Instead, the Magistrate wrongly assumed that Arredondo wanted
the court to "infer [Bob's] intent to devise to the Arredondo's [sic] because they are nominated to
be the primary and alternate personal representatives. Id. at p. 75; see id. at pp. 120-122. It is
unclear how the Magistrate reached this conclusion considering Arredondo' s argument in
opposition to Robin's Motion for Summary Judgment was substantially similar to the argument
presented before the District Court (and now before this Supreme Court)-at all times, Arredondo
has focused primarily on whether the Will, specifically Paragraph Sixth, contains an ambiguity
and whether such ambiguity necessitates a hearing for the admission of extrinsic evidence to
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determine Bob's intent for distribution. 6 Id. at pp. 57-59. Rather than address this argument, the
Magistrate relied on the unfounded concern that "anyone could claim they were an intended
beneficiary" to deny Arredondo's legitimate request to resolve the alleged ambiguity (and
determine Bob's true intent) through an evidentiary hearing and to determine that, contrary to
Bob's expressed wishes in the Will, the Estate should pass intestate. Id. at p. 76-77. The
Magistrate's concern, of course, undermines Idaho's body of law that, if an ambiguity exists, the
remedy is to conduct a hearing and receive extrinsic testimony.
The District Court's analysis, while slightly different, is likewise insufficient. Although the
Court addressed (briefly) whether the distribution clause contains an ambiguity, the Court failed
to undertake a sincere analysis of Arredondo's argument. Id. at 162-163. After defining patent
versus latent ambiguity, the Court simply states that it disagrees with Arredondo's argument that
Paragraph Sixth is ambiguous because it fails to instruct Bob to name a beneficiary. Id. at 163. The
Court attempts to reason that "[a]lthough it is not surprising that the instructions on a fill-in-theblank legal document obtained from a legal forms shop or downloaded from the internet are
unclear and confusing, the instructions themselves do not create a patent or latent ambiguity." Id.
The Court offers no explanation to support its conclusion that, unlike other form wills, Bob's Will
is not unclear and/or confusing (i.e. ambiguous). Id. The analysis then effectively concludes with
the Court's reference to the standard that a testator is presumed to have knowledge of the applicable
laws as well as the legal effect of the language used in his/her will. Id.
6

Regardless of what Arredondo believes, Arredondo has consistently argued that Bob's answer to
Paragraph Sixth did not include a named beneficiary because the instructions in Paragraph Sixth are
ambiguous; thus, an evidentiary hearing on Bob's true intent is warranted.
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The District Court's analysis is both flawed and deficient. While at the same time
acknowledging that instructions in form wills can be "unclear and confusing" the Court, for
reasons that are not provided, did not consider the instructions in this Will unclear or confusing.

Id. This distinction led the Court to the conclusion that Paragraph Sixth is not ambiguous, but the
Court, incredibly, neglected to explain the basis of the distinction. This is obviously a critical
failure considering the entire basis of Arredondo' s argument relies on the premise that the
instructions in Paragraph Sixth are ambiguous.
Further in its analysis the Court states that,
Even assuming arguendo that the instructions are unclear or
confusing, Robert's writing is not. Nothing indicates to the Court
that Robert did not know the laws or did not understand the plain
words of the pre-printed blank Will. For reasons unknown, Robert
simply listed his property and did not name a devisee for each.

Id. Again, the Court's conclusion is flawed. Contrary to the Court's approach here, Bob's answer
to Paragraph Sixth is not independent from the instructions: The only reason Bob answered
Paragraph Sixth - or any provision in the Will - in the manner he did is because the instructions
directed him to do so. Thus, Bob's answer in Paragraph Sixth is entirely dependent on what he
understood the instructions were directing him to do; based on his answer, Bob understood
Paragraph Sixth to direct him to list his personal and real property. Id. at 13. At a minimum, Bob
did not understand that he needed to name a beneficiary (or any person for that matter) in response
to Paragraph Sixth; this is not surprising considering Paragraph Sixth does not direct Bob to name
anyone. The District Court improperly attempted to isolate Bob's answer to conclude (incorrectly)
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that Bob's answer is not confusing. Id. at 163. Obviously, when considered separate and apart from
the instructions, Bob's answer is not necessarily confusing - there is nothing inherently confusing
about listing personal and real property in a Will. But, again, that is the wrong approach, especially
if the Court's paramount concern is to effect the intent of the testator. See In Re Estate of Willdns,
137 Idaho 315,319, 48 P.3d 644,648 (2002); Jones v. Broadbent, 21 Idaho 555,559, 123 P. 476,
477 (1912). The appropriate question is (or should be) why did Bob answer Paragraph Sixth in the
manner he did if the result of such answer (intestacy) is contrary to the purpose of a Will and,
moreover, contrary to Bob's expressed intentions in the Will to disinherit his children. As is
evident by the decisions, the lower courts did not undertake this analysis.
Both lower courts acknowledged the ambiguities present in Bob's Will but, for reasons
unknown, refused to accept that these ambiguities render the Will ambiguous. The fact that Bob
did not answer Paragraph Sixth correctly by naming a beneficiary should be reason enough to
investigate further into why Bob did not identify a beneficiary, despite executing a valid Will and
despite apparent attempts in the Will to disinherit his children from receiving any portion of his
Estate. 7 Id. pp. 12-15.

7

Paragraph Ninth of the Will contains a pre-printed provision which indicates that the testator intends to
make a handwritten list indicating to whom real and personal property should be distributed. Both lower
courts, particularly the District Court, observed the absence of any known list. Id. at p. 14; See id. at pp. 72,
161, 163-165. The Court's observations on the absence of such list suggests Bob did not have intentions
for the disposition of his Estate. Arguably, Bob's list is contained in Paragraph Sixth but, either way, the
focus on the list is misplaced. The issue is whether Paragraph Sixth's instructions are ambiguous. As stated
repeatedly herein, and as acknowledged by both lower courts, there is at least some intention expressed by
Bob in the Will for the disposition of his Estate. Id. at 76-77, 164. Thus, whether Bob made a separate
handwritten list is immaterial.
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At the very least, the evidence and arguments presented by Arredondo demonstrate that
there are material facts concerning the Will and Bob's intentions at issue in this case; thus, partial
summary judgment in favor of Robin is inappropriate. See I.R.C.P. 56(c).

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ASSUMING BOB UNDERSTOOD THE
LEGAL EFFECT OF FAILING TO NAME A BENEFICIARY IN THE WILL'S
DISTRIBUTION CLAUSE.
The District Court's analysis of whether Paragraph Sixth is ambiguous effectively

concludes with the Court's recitation of the standard that "a testator is presumed to have knowledge
of the provisions of his or her state's laws of descent and distribution and to intend the legal effect
oflanguage used." Id. at p. 163; see Hintze v. Black, 125 Idaho 655, 658, 873 P.2d 909, 912 (Ct.
App. 1994); Am. Jur. 2d Wills, Testator's knowledge of Law§ 1017. As explained below, the
Court's reliance on this standard is misplaced considering Bob, a lay person who worked in the
auto detailing industry, executed the Will without the assistance of an attorney. Furthermore, even
if the standard applies (which Arredondo contends it does not), whether Bob understood the legal
effect of the words he used in the Will does not negate the possibility that the Will contains
ambiguity, or that such ambiguity created the potential for a contrary result than the one intended
by Bob (intestacy).

i.

Bob's Actions and Expressed Intentions in the Will Contradict the Result of
Intestate Succession; thus, Bob Did Not Understand the Legal Effect of the
Language Used in His Will.

In its decision, the District Court cited to Hintze v. Black, 125 Idaho 655 (Ct. App. 1994),
as a catch-all requirement that Bob understood the legal effect of the language used in the Will and
is presumed to have knowledge of the distribution and inheritance laws of the state of Idaho. R. at
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p. 163. Contrary to the facts and issues before this Court, the Hintze court was faced with
determining whether a technical term used by the testatrix (who drafted the will with her attorney)
evinced a different intention than the likely result of using such term. 125 Idaho at 656, 873 P .2d
at 910. Thus, the Hintze case is inapposite to the present matter.
First, the entire basis of the appeal in Hintze is different than the one presented here: In

Hintze, the question at issue was whether the testatrix' s use of the word "distribution" should be
construed in its technical sense. Id. Here, the question is whether the pre-printed instructions in
Paragraph Sixth of the form Will contain an ambiguity such that Bob's response thereto lacks
clarity regarding his true intent for the disposition of his Estate. Bob himself did not use any
technical terms in his response Paragraph Sixth; Bob simply listed his real and personal property.
There are no terms in Paragraph Sixth which clearly signaled to Bob, a lay person, that he was
supposed to supply a name as the beneficiary of his Estate. 8 Thus, the standard that Bob understand
the technical terms used in the Will does not apply.
Second, the testatrix in Hintze drafted her will with the assistance of an attorney - the
District Court failed to account for this critical distinction. R., p. 163. In Hintze, the court stated
that "a testatrix is presumed to intend the legal effect of language used in a will, particularly if,
as here, the will was drawn by a lawyer." Id. at 658, 873 P.2d at 912 (emphasis added). As the

Court knows, Bob's Will is a form will, which Bob purchased online and- although not mentioned

8

While the phrase "I hereby give, devise and bequeath" is generally understood by attorneys to signal a
distribution provision, a lay person such as Bob cannot be presumed to intuitively understand the traditional
intent of this phrase. Again, absent a specific direction to name a person or persons to whom the "real,
personal, or mixed" property should be given, the instructions as written in Paragraph Sixth could
understandably be misinterpreted by a lay person such as Bob. R., p. 13.
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by either of the lower courts - was executed without the assistance of an attorney; unlike the lower
courts in this case, other courts have appropriately considered whether the testator drafted and/or
executed the subject will with the assistance of an attorney. See Estate ofKime, 144 Cal. App. 3d
246, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1983). In a related manner, the Hintze court explained:

If the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, this intent [of the
testator] is derived from the will itself. However, if the meaning of
a term is ambiguous, the court can look to extrinsic evidence to
determine intent. In the absence of extrinsic evidence of intent, the
court may apply rules of construction to interpret the instrument.
One such rule is that where a term used in a will has a technical,
iegai meaning, it will be given that technical meaning unless it is
inconsistent with the testator's intent as derived from the
context of the will.
Id. at 658,873 P.2d at 912 (quoting Idaho Code§ 15-2-603; Dolan v. Johnson, 95 Idaho 385,388,

509 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1973); Matter ofEstate ofBerriochoa, 108 Idaho 474,475, 700 P.2d 96, 97
(Ct. App. 1985); In re Estate ofJulian, 221 Ill. App. 3d 369, 592 N.E. 2d 39, 169 Ill. Dec. 552 (Ill.
1991); Zauner v. Brewer, 220 Conn. 176,596 A.2d 388 (Conn. 1991)) (emphasis added).
Here, the District Court concluded (without explanation) that the instructions in Paragraph
Sixth are not ambiguous and, further, that "[e]ven assuming arguendo that the instructions are
unclear or confusing, Robert's writing is not." R., p. 163. The question is not whether Bob's answer
is inherently ambiguous: The question is whether Paragraph Sixth's instructions lack the requisite
clarity (i.e. a direction to name a beneficiary) which caused Bob to respond to Paragraph Sixth
without naming a beneficiary. The Court did not explain its conclusion that the instructions
themselves are not ambiguous. Arredondo contends the instructions are ambiguous and, as the
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Hintze court provides, "if the meaning of a term is ambiguous, the court can look to extrinsic
evidence to determine intent." Hintze, 125 Idaho at 658, 873 P.2d at 912.
Perhaps most fundamental to this Court's analysis is the understanding that Bob voluntarily
executed a valid Will. The Will is signed by two witnesses and, even though not required under
Idaho law, a notary. R., p. 15. It seems reasonable to infer that, by purchasing a form will online,
Bob did not intend to hire an attorney to help him execute the Will. In his Will, Bob appointed
David and Gloria Arredondo as his Personal Representative and Alternative Representative,
respectively, (in the paragraph immediately preceding the distribution clause) and expressed his
intentions to exclude both of his children (as well as their children) from inheriting anything in his
Estate. 9
Simply put, these are not the actions or decisions of a person who has no intent for the
disposition of his Estate. Moreover, these are not the actions of a person who understood that, by
not naming a person in Paragraph Sixth as the beneficiary, his children - whom he unambiguously
disinherited .. would then inherit the Estate through intestacy. If Bob understood this consequence,
there would have been absolutely no point in executing the Will.
As explained above, the only difference between Paragraph Sixth and other paragraphs in
the Will where a name is required (Paragraphs Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth) is that Paragraph
Sixth does not explicitly direct the testator to provide the name of the intended beneficiary. Id. at
pp. 12-13. This is a critical component where an insufficient response (not naming a beneficiary)

9

Bob did not answer Paragraph Third, even though the instructions expressly direct the testator to name
his/her children. Id. at p. 12. Furthermore, Bob wrote in, ''NO- NO- NO RAW" next to Paragraph Seventh
to prevent the possibility of any disposition to potential grandchildren. Id. at p. 13.
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has the possible effect of negating the entire purpose of the Will. Had the instructions replaced the
last words "as followed" with, for instance, "to the following person(s)" - or something to that
effect - there would be no doubt as to what Bob was required to do when responding to Paragraph
Sixth.
Thus, the only way to reconcile Bob's response to Paragraph Sixth with the intended
purpose of a distribution clause is to acknowledge that the instructions did not clearly impart to
Bob the need to actually name the person or persons whom he intended to inherit the residuary
Estate. Bob was a man who worked in the auto detailing industry; Bob bought the Will from an
online legal forms shop and executed it without the assistance of an attorney. Given the
circumstances and the evidence present, the lower courts' assumption that Bob understood the
legal effect of failing to name a beneficiary in the distribution clause is the least logical of all the
possible explanations. See Estate of Kime, 144 Cal. App. 3d 246, 262, 193 Cal. Rptr. 718, 728
(1983) (where the court took into consideration that the form will was filled in by the decedent
without the assistance of an attorney, that the decedent was unfamiliar with the technical meaning
of the word "executrix," and that the decedent likely understood the word "appoint" to include her
intention to name the executrix as the beneficiary of the estate).
ii.

Case Law Supports Arredondo's Request for an Evidentiary Hearing to
Resolve the Ambiguity in Paragraph Sixth.

In Estate ofKirk v. Seideman, the Idaho Supreme Court faced the question of whether the

magistrate erred when certain extrinsic and parol evidence was admitted for the purpose of
clarifying the decedent's intentions for the distribution of her estate. 127 Idaho at 822, 907 P.2d at
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799. As part ofits analysis, the Court addressed whether the language of the decedent's estate plan
contained sufficient ambiguity to permit the magistrate's resort to the admission of parol evidence.

Id. at 823, 907 P.2d at 800. Specifically, the Court evaluated whether conditional language used
in the last document executed by the decedent, a note handwritten on a tom-off receipt section of
a Medicare check and stapled to a relevant trust instrument (the Script), was ambiguous. Id. at 821,
823, 907 P .2d at 798, 800.
On the Script, the decedent wrote, "[i]f anything happens to me on a trip to La Jolla, the
following things to go to the named people ... " Id. at 823-24, 907 P.2d at 800-801. The decedent
attached the Script to a trust amendment which explained the method of intended distribution. Id.
The decedent then placed the documents in a three-ring notebook with other estate planning
documents. Id. at 824, 907 P .2d at 801.
The magistrate determined that the conditional language used in the Script constituted a
latent ambiguity and interpreted the actions taken by the decedent (her action of including the
Script with her formally executed estate planning documents) inconsistent with the expressed
condition. Id. To resolve the ambiguity, the magistrate admitted extrinsic evidence in the form of
testimony from the two co-trustees named in the trust amendment. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the magistrate and held that the trial court
"properly admitted parol evidence to resolve the latent ambiguity created by the conditional
language of the Script as well as the stapling of the document to the Second Amendment." Id. The
Court further determined that the co-trustees' testimony, together with the fact that the Script had
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been attached to the trust amendment, resolved the ambiguity and allowed the Court to fully effect
the decedent's wishes. Id.
In its decision, the District Court did not address Arredondo's argument pursuant to the

Kirk case; however, the inconsistency between Bob's actions (executing the Will) and the written
words of the Will (expressly disinheriting his children versus failing to name a beneficiary) falls
squarely within the Kirk case. In Kirk, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that the only way to
resolve such an inconsistency is to determine that an ambiguity exists and to allow extrinsic
evidence on the decedent's true intentions for distribution of the estate. The lower courts simply
bypassed that critical step to reach a conclusion that is in obvious conflict with the intentions
expressed by Bob throughout the Will. A simple hearing addressing Bob's intent for disposition
of his Estate is all that is needed in this case.
Judging from the lower courts' decisions, there is an overriding concern with the courts'
impression that Arredondo is asking the Court to infer Bob's intent. To the contrary, Arredondo is
not asking the Court to assume either he or Gloria Arredondo are the intended beneficiaries;
Arredondo is simply asking the Court to broaden the scope of its consideration thus far and to
follow the standard procedure, which requires that an evidentiary hearing for the admission of
extrinsic evidence be held to determine the identity of Bob's intended beneficiary.
Accordingly, Arredondo asks this Court to determine that the Will contains an ambiguity
either: 1) by the plain language of the instructions which do not include a specific direction to the
testator to name the intended beneficiary of the estate (patent ambiguity) and/or 2) by the obvious
inconsistency between Bob's actions in executing a Will and expressly disinheriting both Robin

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 29

and Robert from the Will and Bob's omission of a named beneficiary to the Estate (latent
ambiguity). Such a finding will require a remand to the Magistrate Court for a hearing on Bob's
intent to dispose his Estate.
C.

THE LOWER COURTS' DECISIONS DISREGARD THE CLEAR INTENT OF
THE DECEDENT BY ORDERING AN INTESTATE DISPOSITION OF THE
ESTATE TO THE DECEDENT'S CHILDREN.

i.

Effecting the Intent of the Testator is the Ultimate Goal.

It is a well-established principle that, '"[i]n construing the provisions of a will to ascertain
the meaning of a testator, the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the testator's intent; and
... this intent is to be ascertained from a full view of everything within the four comers of the
instrument."' In Re Estate of Wilkins, 137 Idaho 315,319, 48 P.3d 644,648 (2002) (quoting Jones
v. Broadbent, 21 Idaho 555,559, 123 P. 476,477 (1912)) (emphasis added); see Allen v. Shea, 105
Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041 (1983); Idaho Code§ 15-2-603.
Here, little to no interpretation is necessary to reach the conclusion that Bob did not want
either Robin or Robert to inherit his Estate. In fact, Bob took extra care when executing the Will
to ensure that would not happen which the lower courts acknowledged in their decisions. See R.
pp. 76-77, 164. Thus, to reach a conclusion that is in clear conflict with Bob's expressed intentions
is to completely disregard the Court's primary responsibility of ensuring that every effort has been
taken to fully effect the decedent's wishes.
It is clear by Bob's efforts to execute a valid Will and to specifically disinherit his children
in the Will that he had at least some intention for how the Estate would be distributed. As explained
above, there is a legitimate question as to how the Estate should be distributed. There are at least
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two valid bases for the Court to undertake further investigatory efforts into who Bob intended to
be the beneficiaries of his Estate: First, the Court is required to ascertain the testator's intent and,
second, Paragraph Sixth contains an ambiguity sufficient to justify the admission of extrinsic
evidence on the issue of intended beneficiaries. See Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 484, 777 P.2d
255, 256 (1989) (parol evidence may be considered to determine the intent of the drafter of a
document if an ambiguity exists); Estate ofKirkv. Seideman, 127 Idaho 817,907 P.2d 794 (1995);

In re Estate ofBerriochoa, 108 Idaho 474,475, 700 P.2d 96, 97 (1985). 10
Arredondo is asking the Court to acknowledge an inherent ambiguity in the instructions of
the Will's distribution clause and to allow a hearing to admit extrinsic evidence so that the parties
may understand who Bob intended to inherit his Estate. Arredondo's request is not prohibited but
is consistent with the well-established case law that permits extrinsic evidence in cases where an
ambiguity exists. Id.

ii.

Courts Favor Testacy Over Intestacy.

A will should be interpreted to prevent intestacy when it evinces an intention to dispose of
the entire estate. See In Re Corwin 's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 383 P.2d 339 (1963). Here, the Will
evinces an intention to dispose of the entire Estate because it contains a residuary distribution
clause, and it conforms with the statutory formalities for a self-proved will. Furthermore, the Will
shows a clear intention to avoid intestacy by omitting Robin and Robert and declaring "NO-NO-

10

In Paragraph 1 of the Petition, Arredondo averred that he believed, "that he and his wife, Gloria
Arredondo, are the intended devisees; however Petitioner understands there is an ambiguity in the
Will."
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NO!" to the mere possibility that any portion of the Estate could be passed to Bob's children or
grandchildren.
This is not a situation, as the lower courts apparently believed, where the Court would have
to "'adopt a construction of the Will based on conjecture as to what the testator may have intended,
although not expressed."' R. p. 76 (quoting In Re Estate of Corwin, 86 Idaho 1, 6, 383 P.2d 339,
341-42 (1963)); see R. p. 164-165. To the contrary, Bob directly expressed his intention to
disinherit both Robin and Robert from his Estate. See id. at pp. 12-13. The Magistrate Court
acknowledged that Bob expressed "some intention to disinherit his children from the will." Id. at
pp. 76-77. Distribution through intestate succession flies in the face of that expressed intention.
Accordingly, some action should be taken to prevent distribution of the Decedent's Estate through
intestate succession. The Court's duty is straight-forward: conduct a hearing to determine intent.
See Estate ofKirk v. Seideman, 127 Idaho 817, 907 P .2d 794 ( 1995).
Arredondo is not asking the Court to do what is prohibited but, rather, is asking the Court
to follow the basic principles of Idaho law which require the Court to take every effort to fully
effect the intentions of the Decedent. The lower courts did not do that in this case. There is more
than sufficient bases for this Court to justify a hearing for the admission of extrinsic evidence
toward the ultimate goal of effecting the Decedent's wishes for the distribution of his Estate.

D.

THE CONCERN OVER ALLOWING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS UNFOUNDED.
The Magistrate Court posited that Arredondo "wants to have a trial [hearing] and,

apparently, introduce extrinsic evidence that Wall, Sr. intended to give those items not to his son
or daughter but to Mr. Arredondo and or Gloria Arredondo .... " R., p. 75. The District Court
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disagreed with Arredondo' s argument that this concern was unfounded, stating that ''the
magistrate's concerns regarding extrinsic evidence are valid because the will is not ambiguous it is blank." Id. at p. 165. First, and of critical importance, the Will is not blank; Paragraph Sixth
is not blank. See id. at pp. 11-15. Bob's oversight in naming a beneficiary in Paragraph Sixth is
not the same as leaving Paragraph Sixth ''blank" and the District Court's characterization is either
a gross simplification of the issue with Paragraph Sixth or an indication of a fundamental
misunderstanding of the issues before the Court. The Court's subsequent analysis suggests the
latter: Rather than address Arredondo's substantive points, the Court concluded that, because Bob
(supposedly) "did not write anything in the section of the Will that could even remotely be
identified as a person or other entity to whom Robert intended to devise his property," extrinsic
evidence could not be allowed. Id. at p. 163.
Arredondo is the Personal Representative of the Estate and has a duty to fulfill the
intentions of the Decedent. See id. at p. 12. Bob, importantly, did not name his children in
Paragraph Third; instead, he emphatically wrote "NO-NO-NO!" to the mere possibility that his
children (or their children) might inherit any portion of his Estate. 11 Id. at pp. 12-13. The lower
courts ignored Arredondo's valid argument that ambiguity in the Will's instructions resulted in the
Bob's misunderstanding and, ultimately, the absence of a named beneficiary. At the same time,
both courts acknowledged that Bob may have intended to bequeath his property to a beneficiary.

See id. at pp. 76-77, 164. Rather than address Arredondo's argument, the lower courts concluded

11

Additionally, and as addressed earlier, the only people Bob identified, aside from himself, were
David and Gloria Arredondo. See id. at pp. 12-13.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 33

that Arredondo is asking the Court to infer from the Will that the Arredondos are the beneficiaries,
but this conclusion is based on speculation rather than the argument put forth. Thus, the lower
courts missed the point that, if the Will contains an ambiguous provision, the procedure is not to
name a person through speculation; rather the procedure is to conduct a hearing on the testator's
intent.
Additionally, as argued before the District Court but not addressed in its decision, the
Magistrate's speculation that "anyone could claim they were an intended beneficiary" should the
Court hold a hearing on extrinsic evidence is not a valid concern. Id. at p. 77. As demonstrated
in the Kirk case where the magistrate allowed two witnesses, the co-trustees, to testify as to the
decedent's intent, the Court can exercise discretion in determining who can testify at a hearing.

See Estate of Kirk v. Seideman, 127 Idaho at 824, 907 P.2d at 801. The court in Estate of Duke
provides further guidance, reasoning that,
Although anyone may claim to be an intended beneficiary of a will,
an appropriately tailored reformation remedy will alleviate concerns
regarding unintended beneficiaries; it is unlikely there will be many
persons who have a connection to testator and can produce clear and
convincing evidence both of a mistake in the drafting of the will at
the time the will was written and of the testator's specific intentions
concerning the disposition of property. Categorically denying
reformation may result in unjust enrichment if there is a mistake of
expression in the will, and imposing a burden of clear and
convincing evidence of both the existence of the mistake and of the
testator's actual and specific intent at the time the will was drafted
helps safeguard against baseless allegations.
61 Cal. 4th 871,891, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295,310,352 P.3d 863,877 (2015).
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Ultimately, the lower courts' concern should not be a deterrent to holding a hearing on
extrinsic evidence. It is the Court's duty, as well as Arredondo's responsibility as the Personal
Representative, to give effect to the intention of the testator when interpreting a will. See Allen v.

Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 665 P .2d 1041 (1983). Moreover, it is the Court's duty to hold a hearing when
an ambiguity exists. The fact that distribution of the Estate may be slightly delayed by a hearing
on extrinsic evidence does not outweigh, nor should it override, the parties' responsibility in tiling
the steps necessary to execute the Decedent's true intentions.

V.

CONCLUSION

Arredondo is not asking this Court to determine the beneficiaries of the Decedent's Estate.
Arredondo is simply asking this Court to recognize that intestate succession should be a last resort,
particularly in this case where the Decedent executed a valid Will and contains the Decedent's
express intention that neither of his children inherit any portion of his Estate. There are obvious
ambiguities in the Will but the lower courts failed to address or sincerely consider whether such
ambiguities exist. Arredondo respectfully asks this Court to evaluate the plain language of the
Will, take into consideration the Decedent's decision to execute a Will which clearly and
unequivocally disinherits both Robin and Robert, and to follow the blueprint set forth by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Kirk. Finally, Arredondo respectfully requests that this Court make a
determination that a hearing for the admission of extrinsic evidence is appropriate and remand the
case to the Magistrate Court for such hearing and further consideration on the question of Estate
distribution.
DATED this 9th day of July, 2020
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